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Hong Kong, had presented an ultimatum with a verbal warning that action would be
taken.
If, after that, nothing was done, he thought the position would be intolerable. He agreed that the capture of forts was excessive, but recommended the destruction of Matshed Barracks. Anything was better than nothing."
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He added that he had documentary evidence tending to show that the firing was by Whampoa Cadets, who had a grudge against the Lungshan because she had previously endangered small craft by her wash. He said it was essential to nip such lawless action in the bud or the West River would become like the Yang-tsze. 15. On the 21st May (at 0035) the Commander-in-chief informed Admiral Boyle that he considered that if Mr. Brenan's proposals (.e.. destruction of Matsheds) had been acted on at once. the incident would now be closed. He deprecated the forcing of serious issues over a trivial incident.
16. On the 21st May, received Admiral Boyle's telegram of the 20th, saying that his telegram (in paragraph) had been sent before he had seen the Commander- in-chief's telegram to the Admiralty or reply to the Governor. Also that he had now read Admiralty telegrams Nos. 817 to 820 (which define the Government's attitude and policy in China as regards trade).
He thought it would save delay if he were supplied with Foreign Office cyphers. (Note. In February last, Commander-in-chief asked that R.A. 1 and R.A.Y. should be supplied with Foreign Office cyphers, but it was not approved).
17. On the 21st May, the Commander-in-chief issued orders that if the Chinese general had not apologised by 1100 on the 23rd May and he had been warned that action would be taken, he authorised the destruction of the Matshed Barracks by incendiary bombs at the spot where the "Lungshan was fired at.
18. Late on the 21st May, received a telegram from Senior Naval Officer, West River (passed by Senior Naval Officer. West River. but presumably emanating from Consul-General, Canton) appealing for Commander-in-chief's support over the whole affair.
He confirmed that the shooting was by Whampoa cadets as act of revenge for petty grievances.
It was essential for him to act quickly and he had obtained approval of the Minister. Also that the case was clearly covered by the Admiralty instructions, and he fully believed that he had the concurrence of the naval authorities.
His demands were extremely moderate and he had given five days' grace. If no action follows rejection, position will be humiliating. If we make show of force he believed they would give way, but something would have to be done.
19. On the 21st May, received telegram from Minister, then at Shanghai. He said his only action had been to concur in the proposals of the Consul-General, Canton, in his first two telegrams. He noted that demands had been presented, but did not know whether Commander-in-chief had approved that being done. (Commander-in-chief was given no opportunity of any say in the matter.)
For the rest, he agreed that sanction should not be excessive and that the form thereof laid with the Commander-in-chief. Still, he thought action of some sort was justified under the Admiralty instructions.
20. Late on the 21st May, "Dauntless" reported that Chung Wa Fu had been on board in uniform and tendered formal apology.
21. On the 22nd May. Commander-in-chief informed Admiral Boyle he presumed the incident was now closed and that he had recalled "Dauntless.'
22. In answer to the Commander-in-chief, Admiral Boyle replied on the 22nd May that concurrently with the receipt of that telegram he had received a request from the Consul-General, Canton, for a display of force below Dane Island on Monday, the 23rd May. He added that the consul-general had not yet reported himself satisfied, nor had he suggested the withdrawal of "Dauntless," which is still off Whampoa. The consul-general went further and requested that display might be made whether the demands in full are meanwhile acceded to or not.
23. The Commander-in-chief then asked Admiral Boyle to report fully what took place when the apology was preferred. Was it accepted and were the other conditions complied with? The Commander-in-chief saw no object in a display of force if the demands had been complied with. In a later telegram on the 22nd May, the Commander-in-chief informed Admiral Boyle that nothing was to be done until the Consul-General, Canton, had reported to the Commander-in-chief.
24. On the 22nd May. Admiral Boyle replied that he had been informed by the Senior Naval Officer. West River, that a Chinese senior officer in uniform, accom-
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panied by a civilian aide-de-camp, had proceeded on board Dauntless, and stated that he had come to apologise for the firing on the Lungshan." The captain of Dauntless accepted the apology. He added that the question of punishment of the offenders had not yet been settled to Mr. Brenan's satisfaction. The 200 dollars had been promised but not yet paid.
25. Early on the 23rd May, intercepted a telegram from Consul-General, Canton (dated 2200/22nd) to Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong, stating that an apology had been made, but that the demand for punishment and compensation had not yet been complied with. They probably would be complied with provided we made show of force, and he asked the Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong, to do what he could regarding the latter. He would report immediately satisfaction was received.
26. At 1500 on the 23rd May received a message from the Consul-General, Canton (passed on to Commander-in-chief by Senior Naval Officer, Hong Kong), asking to be informed definitely by 3 P.M. whether any action would be taken in the event of the remaining demands not being complied with.
27.
At 1809 on the 23rd May, the Commander-in-chief informed Admiral Boyle and the Consul-General, Canton, that, after consultation with His Majesty's Minister, he approved the display of force.
was
28. Shortly afterwards, Admiral Boyle reported that "Dauntless' returning to Hong Kong, and later that all demands had been complied with in full. The Commander-in-chief then cancelled his permission for the display of force.
Annex (2) to Enclosure 1.
Memorandum,
RETALIATORY action.
As His Majesty's Government have delegated to me certain discretionary powers,
I wish to impress upon all commanding officers of His Majesty's ships the urgent necessity of achieving successfully the local retaliatory measures required to punish and prevent the recurrence of hostile action by the Chinese, with the smallest possible expenditure of ammunition and other resources.
2. The expenditure of a large amount of ammunition with indifferent results is undesirable both from a political and economical point of view, since it tends to diminish the moral effect of such gun-fire, and may encourage the Chinese to go to greater lengths.
3. While, therefore, His Majesty's ships have authority to return fire which has been directed at them or at any other vessel flying the British flag, using the main armament and manoeuvring the ship as requisite, such action should only be taken when the target is definitely located and where the gun-fire can be really effective.
4. In cases where the target cannot be located, or where for any other reason no effective retaliatory action can be taken at the time, I am to be informed immediately of the circumstances, giving sufficient detail to enable other units of His Majesty's navy to proceed to that point particularly to deal with the culprits as ordered by me.
5. Commanding officers are to note that the instructions contained in paragraph 4 above apply equally to any circumstances in which the lives of British nationals are endangered, or their property is suffering actual, deliberate, and wanton destruction.
In cases where the lives of British nationals are in imminent peril, and there is not time to refer to me, commanding officers may open fire to save life.
In every case I am to be immediately and fully informed of the details. The reports should contain, as far as possible, the exact position of the culprits and scene of the outrage, and the suggested local punitive action with forces required for its successful and speedy execution if authorised by me.
R. Y. TYRWHITT, Vice-Admiral,
H.M.S." Hawkins" at Hankow, May 18, 1927.
Commander-in-Chief.
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